6. Selective Engagement
The Council of Europe is facing a profound membership crisis in its dealings with Azerbaijan, primarily driven by the institution’s lack of unity.
While the Committee of Ministers and the Secretary General favour a conciliatory approach, PACE has conditioned approval of a new Azerbaijani delegation on concrete progress, including the release of political prisoners.
Since the suspension of the Azerbaijani delegation from PACE, the Secretary General’s office has continued dialogue with Baku. Still, these discussions remain behind closed doors and have yet to yield any meaningful results.
During the November 2024 COP29 climate summit, Secretary General Alain Berset visited Baku. The official press release issued by his office did not refer to the ongoing wave of arrests targeting journalists and activists. Instead, the statement highlighted “Azerbaijan’s significant contribution to interreligious and intercultural dialogue,” with Berset emphasising the importance of continued dialogue.
The majority of the Committee of Ministers has expressed a similar position. Representatives of several member states argue that PACE exceeded its mandate by challenging the credentials of specific delegations and should have prioritised dialogue instead. Concerns have also been raised that Azerbaijan’s withdrawal from PACE could escalate into its withdrawal from the Council of Europe as a whole. Many states fear that, if Azerbaijan follows through on this threat, others may be encouraged to do the same, potentially undermining the institution’s raison d’etre.
Despite earlier threats and concerns from the Committee of Ministers, Azerbaijan has not attempted to withdraw from the CoE. On the contrary, after a brief pause following the suspension of its PACE delegation, Baku resumed cooperation with selected CoE bodies. The country remains actively engaged in the Committee of Ministers and continues its dialogue with the Secretary General. It has also not rejected the upcoming edition of the Action Plan – a four-year reform plan scheduled to start this year. Although no details have been revealed, Council of Europe representatives confirmed earlier this year that work was underway to initiate it.
When it comes to the ECtHR, Baku used the PACE suspension as a pretext to ignore its judgments. In April 2025, President Ilham Aliyev declared that, since Azerbaijan had not participated in the election of ECtHR judges after PACE refused to ratify its credentials, “none of the decisions of the European Court are valid for us.”
One of the CoE bodies Azerbaijan has consistently ignored is the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). In July 2024, the CPT took the rare step of issuing a public statement on Azerbaijan. The Committee cited the government’s “outright refusal” to cooperate and expressed deep concern over systemic ill-treatment of detainees in police custody.
Azerbaijan’s absence from PACE has a dual effect. On the one hand, it restricts Azerbaijan’s political presence within the institution. It limits its ability to defend national interests, as it cannot participate in debates, vote on resolutions, or contribute to the election of the Secretary-General and ECtHR judges. On the other hand, this absence shields Azerbaijan from critical scrutiny. Without a delegation in place, rapporteurs and the Monitoring Committee are unable to present reports on the country’s human rights record, as there are no representatives to respond to findings or engage in oversight.
Overall, Azerbaijan’s selective engagement approach allows it to benefit from CoE membership while avoiding core obligations. The cost, however, is borne by the institution itself. The credibility of the CoE is steadily eroding, and a concerning precedent has been established.
The dangers are no longer hypothetical. In 2025, Georgia began to replicate this approach after deeply flawed elections in 2024 and in anticipation of a critical PACE resolution on democratic backsliding. By pre-emptively withdrawing its parliamentary delegation, the Government in Tbilisi shielded itself from scrutiny while retaining the benefits of CoE membership.
This action demonstrates how Azerbaijan’s challenge has emboldened others to push the limits of the institution’s tolerance. If such practices are left unchecked, the CoE risks a series of partial withdrawals and selective compliance, rendering its core mechanisms ineffective and its authority seriously weakened.