The Norwegian Sanctions ActDoes it permit the Norwegian Government to become proactive in imposing human rights sanctions?
03-10-2022
3 Recommendations
The Sanctions Act significantly strengthens the toolbox for Norway’s human rights policies. However, some shortcomings exist, such as the Act not including “serious corruption” among sanctionable conduct. An unanswered question is whether the government will invite civil society actors to submit cases.
The Act authorises the Government to implement UN Security Council sanctions and restrictive measures adopted by intergovernmental organisations (such as the EU) or measures that otherwise have “broad international support”. The measures must aim to maintain peace and security or ensure respect for democracy, the rule of law, human rights, or international law in general. It is worth noting that the Act includes “Svalbard”, where several countries have vested interests, including the Russian Federation.
The Norwegian government may apply the Act by implementing EU and Security Council sanctions only. However, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee maintains that a more ambitious approach should be developed. As shown by Wikborg Rein’s legal analysis presented in the report, the Act allows the Government to actively seek international cooperation to apply sanctions against those who commit human rights violations with impunity.
Norway should seek cooperation with other Nordic, Baltic, and democratic European States, and possibly with Australia and Canada, to form a group of like-minded states that adopt human rights sanctions against the same violators while also aiming to influence EU human rights sanctions (Magnitsky) policies. The group should coordinate with the US, which currently has the most far-reaching sanction practices.
Norway should establish a human rights sanctions desk in the Foreign Ministry to receive submissions on human rights (Magnitsky) sanctions cases and to dialogue with civil society and professional actors on its sanctions policies. As noted in Section 5.3 below, “there are quotes in the preparatory works suggesting that there is political manoeuvring room “in special cases” for Norway, together with “a few other states” to play a more active and leading role in sanctions policy, i.e., not exclusively following the EU, but also taking its own practice initiatives. We would think that establishing a sanctions desk or forming a network of like-minded states that seek to adopt coordinated human rights sanctions against the same violators, are (political) initiatives that could be pursued in this regard.”
Norway and like-minded states should support the creation of an international human rights sanction commission (“Magnitsky commission”), a non-governmental body constituted by respected and renowned persons with high integrity and pertinent competence in international human rights and international criminal law. Such a commission can help develop human rights sanctions into a coordinated and effective tool for democratic states to strengthen respect for human rights where it is most needed.